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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the sensitivity relation between firm investment and internal 
liquidity by splitting samples into two different groups of firm, namely the 
tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sectors. This paper finds that during boom 
periods, there is no significant financial constraint on the T and N sectors. In 
post-crisis periods, it seems that both sectors also have no significant important 
problem in their internal finance. Both sectors basically move comparably. The 
main finding is relatively different with several theoretical predictions, especially 
Tornell and Westermann (2002a, 2004), in which the T-sector would be predicted 
as experiencing less financial constraint in burst period. However, we find that 
debt is important variable for sustaining investment in Indonesia. By employing 
panel data analysis, the findings of this study can shed light on the financing 
behavior of listed companies in Indonesia, as well as on their investment behavior 
in the midst of financing constraints and credit market imperfections. The study’s 
sample contains 147 companies listed on the Jakarta Stock exchange for at least 5 
five consecutive years between 1994 – 2004.  
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1. Introduction  
From the academic point of view, the 1997 Asian crisis is a challenging “puzzle”, 
inspiring research efforts in many fields of study. Studies on both theoretical and empirical 
levels have been employed to understand this recent crisis, which is referred to as a third-
generation crisis. Nonetheless, research on it is still far from exhaustive due to the 
phenomenon’s intricacy.  
This paper proposes an explanation centered on micro-level evidence of the 
macroeconomic vulnerability arising from the asymmetry in financing opportunities between 
the tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sectors in Indonesia. For this issue, Tornell and 
Westermann (2002a) propose an interesting explanation: “Many countries that have 
liberalized their financial markets, have witnessed the development of lending booms 
sometimes ended with a twin currency and banking crises and is followed by a protracted 
credit crunch that outlives a short-lived recession.” They identify two pivotal problems as the 
main sources of common crises in developing countries, namely risky currency mismatch and 
asymmetric financing opportunities across the T-sector and N-sector.  
This paper deals with the latter issue, which is the asymmetric financing opportunity 
available to the T- and N-sectors at the onset and in the aftermath of a crisis. Related to this 
issue, Tornell and Westermann (2002a, 2002b, and 2004) further explain the coincidence of 
credit market imperfections and asymmetric sector development as a common phenomenon in 
middle-income countries (MICs) that leads to financial fragility. For countries concerned, in 
the period of lending booms, the N-sector grows faster than the T-sector, but inversely, the N-
sector recovers more slowly than T-sector in the period of credit crunch following a financial 
crisis.1
In line with this explanation, this paper poses a fairly simple question: whether the N-
sector has more financial constraints than the T-sector following a financial crisis in 
Indonesia. This question will be addressed by examining firm-level investment sensitivity 
with its internal liquidity or cash flows, with samples split into two different groups.2 The 
findings of this empirical study should be important in explaining macroeconomic 
vulnerability, since firm-level investment is a pivotal variable in the macroeconomic 
fluctuation or business cycle.  
                                                 
1 An important indication of the presence of credit crunch is a decline in the ratio of credit to GDP. 
2 This study is inspired by Espanol (2005), which employed the discrimination between the tradable and 
non-tradable sectors in analyzing Argentinean firms around financial crises. 
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2. Financing Constraint in Indonesia: Some Stylized Facts 
Indonesia is a country experiencing a relatively slow economic recovery from the 
depth and breadth of crisis which was sparked towards the end of 1997. In 2004, compared to 
other countries in the Southeast Asian region, real GDP growth in Indonesia was relatively 
low: Indonesia had 4.9 % real GDP growth, while Thailand had 6.2 %, the Philippines 6.0 % 
and Malaysia 7.1 %3. Data released by the World Bank shows that following the 1997 shocks, 
Indonesia’s economic performance was weaker than the average performance of East Asian 
countries. In Q-4 2001, Indonesian real GDP growth was 1.0 %, whereas the average growth 
in East Asian countries was 4.3%.  
After having high economic growth for a decade, Indonesia faced a serious upheaval 
in economic performance.4 The dismal performance of Indonesia’s economy was started by 
the presence of extreme shocks due to the 1997 financial crisis. Indonesia is a country 
experiencing a deep crisis, with GDP growth reaching minus (-) 13 % and inflation reaching 
58.5 % at the end of 1998. Meanwhile, to cope with the high currency depreciation, Bank 
Indonesia as a monetary authority raised monthly interest rates on time deposits to 70.44 % in 
August 1998.5 Accordingly, the interest rate on credit was also increased to a significant level 
following the interest rate on time deposits. In such conditions, there were no firms which 
could survive and continue their activities normally. Approximately one half of Indonesian 
corporations became technically insolvent due to currency depreciation accompanied by tight 
monetary and high interest-rate policies.  
In Graph 1, we can see that the monthly interest rate on investment, working capital, 
and deposits rose sharply. Monthly time deposits show the greatest increase since the main 
objective of this type of policy is to absorb money from the market to avoid speculative 
actions in the exchange-rate market by money holders.  
                                                 
3 Data taken from East Asia Update: Solid Growth, New Challenges, published by the World Bank, March 
2006, page 8. The average real GDP growth over eight countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, China) quoted in this report is 6.6 %, which is higher than real GDP 
growth in Indonesia (4.9 %). 
4 In 1993, the World Bank considered Indonesia as one of the best performing countries in the world with 
about 7 % economic growth over several years. Indonesia is one of the East Asian Miracles. See World Bank 
Policy Research Reports titled “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy”, Washington 
DC., 1993. 
5 On August 14th 1997, the monetary authority in Indonesia decided to adopt a free-floating exchange rate 
policy since the depreciation of Rupiah was very high. The Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) depreciated sharply against 
the United States Dollar (USD); from 4,950 IDR/1 USD in December 1997 to 15,000 IDR/1 USD in June 1998. 
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Stylized fact 1. The exchange rate depreciation followed by high interest-rate has 
jeopardized the corporate or real sector balance sheet conditions through multiple 
channels. On one hand, the corporate sector cannot repay their credit and re-access 
loans from banks because of the increase in interest rates, but on the other hand, they 
encounter augmented production costs, especially for import input industries, and 
declining returns or profitability due to decreasing market demand. 
 
 
 
Graph 1. Interest Rates of Commercial Banks 
(monthly data) 
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In emerging countries, bank credit plays a very important role in firms’ expansion, 
since capital market institutions are considerably underdeveloped. Under such conditions, 
monetary policies directly impact upon corporate sector healthiness. Money supply from 
banking institutions should decrease significantly when interest rates are high, since the 
corporate sector could not repay loans with such high interest payments. At the same time, 
due to financial difficulties, the corporate sector experiences worse balance sheets due to the 
deterioration of the debt-equity ratio as well as of internal liquidity. 
In Indonesia, following the 1997 financial crisis, the corporate sector performed 
poorly, with investment levels still in collapse. Instead of expanding their investment, firms 
preferred to consolidate their activities first. It is likely that the poor performance of firm-level 
investment was strongly impacted by tight money policies applied by Bank Indonesia in 
dealing with exchange rate volatility.6 However, it is not the only factor influencing the 
gloomy condition of business activities in Indonesia after the crisis.  
                                                 
6 The tight money policy employed by Bank Indonesia has become a point for debate, since this policy was 
required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose policies were not, however, in line with what really 
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In July 1999, due to the strengthening of economic conditions, Bank Indonesia down-
graded the interest rate to 13.8 % (see Graph 1). It is therefore evident that after July 1999, 
Indonesia’s state of crisis was eased. This was due to macroeconomic conditions which were 
relatively stable, in terms of inflation, the exchange rate, and interest rates. Nevertheless, the 
decrease in interest rates failed to support real sector recovery. It seems that the supply of 
credit from the banking sector was not channeled into the real sector. The question is whether 
it was caused by the inability of the real sector to absorb credit supply or rather by the 
unwillingness of the banking sector to offer credit. 
In Graph 2 it is shown that the outstanding investment credit of commercial banks in 
domestic currency is dominated by the non-tradable sector. In the boom periods, the gaps 
between the credit given to the tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sectors are high; this 
discrepancy diminished during the crisis period, but it again grew after several years of crisis.  
 
Graph 2. Outstanding Investment Credit of Commercial Banks  
in Local Currency (in Billions of Rupiah)  
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Source: based on data from the Indonesian central bank, 
Bank Indonesia (www.bi.go.id) 
 
In Graph 3 we can see that investment credit in foreign currency from commercial 
banks to the non-tradable sector is more volatile than credit to the tradable sector. During the 
crisis, the foreign currency debt of firms in the non-tradable sector increased significantly and 
exceeded the credit to firms in the tradable sector. It may that tradable sector firms have 
greater opportunities to access the capital market or commitments from lenders to reschedule 
                                                                                                                                                        
happened in Asian countries during the crisis. For this issue, see Iwan Jaya Azis, “What Would Have Happened 
in Indonesia if Different Economic Policies Had Been Implemented When the Crisis Started?”, Asian Economic 
Papers, volume 1, Issue 2, Spring 2002. And also Iwan Jaya Azis, “Modelling Crisis Evolution and 
Counterfactual Policy Simulations: A Country Case Study”, ADB Institute Working Paper Series, No.23, August 
2001. 
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their foreign-currency credit, than firms in the non-tradable sector. This effect is also 
attributable to the fact that tradable sector firms may receive returns in foreign currencies due 
to their export activities. 
 
Graph 3. Outstanding Investment Credit of Commercial Banks  
in Foreign Currency (in Billions of Rupiah)  
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Based upon the data showing the outstanding investment credit of commercial banks 
in both domestic and foreign currencies, we can formulate the second stylized fact as follows: 
 
Stylized fact 2. It is likely that the balance sheets of non-tradable sector firms contain 
much more foreign debt than those of tradable sector firms, and therefore the impact 
of exchange rate depreciations had a more serious impact on the N-sector than on the 
T-sector.  
 
Following a currency depreciation accompanied by tight money policies, firms prefer 
not to access credit from the banking sector, and the banking sector tends to be reluctant to 
supply credit to the corporate sector so as to avoid the risk of unpaid debts. In a study 
conducted by Bank Indonesia, it was confirmed that credit crunch is present following 
financial crises in Indonesia.7 The banking sector preferred not to offer their credit to the 
firms sector to avoid the default risk.   
                                                 
7 Bank Indonesia has conducted research on the presence of credit crunch following the financial crisis in 
Indonesia. For further information, the results of the study may be found in www.bi.go.id : “Credit Crunch In 
Indonesia in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Facts, Causes and Policy Implications” Working Paper, 2000, 
Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary Policy Bank Indonesia, prepared by Agung Juda, Bambang 
Kusmiarso, Bambang Pramono, Erwin G. Hutapea, Andry Prasmuko, and Nugroho Joko Prastowo.  
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Theoretically, the lack of credit supply to the firms sector could have a second-round 
effect on business failures, which could also exacerbate the quality of bank loans. Under such 
conditions, there is a risk that the collapsing real sector could give rise to the banking crisis in 
the second round. Hence, there exists a complicated vicious circle which cannot easily be 
resolved. 
 The soaring of interest rates following a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate in 
1997 caused firms’ debt-equity ratio to increase. High interest rates are detrimental to firms’ 
balance sheets. This means that a hike in interest rates directly influences a firm’s corporate 
value, or net worth. Moreover, firms undergoing weak financial conditions tend first to carry 
out financial consolidation, rather than conducting business expansion. Meanwhile, firms with 
a bad balance sheet cannot pay their maturity debt to the bank. At this point, the deterioration 
of the firm’s net worth has a direct correlation with the banking sector’s balance sheet. 
Following a financial crisis, firms usually prefer to reduce their activities by 
postponing their loans from the banking sector. Instead of expansion, firms prefer to 
consolidate their internal activities in operation by reducing their internal liquidity and 
inventories, rather than by borrowing from a bank. In this case, the demand for working-
capital credit decreases significantly. Added to the uncertainties in economic and business 
conditions due to the financial crisis, firms prefer to use their own capital rather than to 
borrow from a bank at high interest rates. 
Bank Indonesia’s study also finds that firms preferred to use their own funds (retained 
earnings) as their main source of finance in the aftermath of the crisis.8 Retained earnings 
were used by 56% of respondents to this survey, while 44% used external funds, the majority 
of which (24%, comprising 14% working capital credit and 10% investment credit) still 
originated from bank credit. Other sources of external financing were the capital market (6%), 
offshore loans (5%), bonds (3%), and from their own group (1%).9
The balance-sheet-effect mechanism simultaneously attacks both the firms and 
banking sectors. This mechanism commonly occurs in countries with weak corporate and 
banking sectors, where third-generation crisis is present. In Mexico, a crisis reduced GDP in 
the last three quarters of 1995 from 9.2% to -8% and then to 7%, respectively. However, 
                                                 
8 Despite the reluctance of the banking sector to offer credit to the firms sector, Bank Indonesia’s survey of 
120 firms concerning their financing behavior following the financial crisis in Indonesia also confirms that the 
firms sector is reluctant to access credit from the banking sector. 
9 See Juda Agung et al. (2000). 
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Mexico was more fortunate than Indonesia since there was an immediate recovery in 
economic conditions. Between the second quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1998, GDP 
growth increased on average by more than 5%.10
In Mexico, asymmetric financing constraints were also present, in which, in the post-
crisis period, the tradable sector grew and recovered easily, whereas the non-tradable sector 
faced stagnation and credit crunch. Some studies predict that the tradable sector is usually 
able to obtain funding from the international market, while the non-tradable sector must 
depend on its own finance because banks are reluctant to provide credit.11
 
Stylized fact 3. Financial constraints on firms prolonged the crisis into the long-term 
and therefore heightened the risk of a banking crisis, since credit could not be 
channeled into the real sector. 
 
 Until the end of 2006, the bulk of liquidity was not channeled to real sector. Bank 
Indonesia (2007) states that: “Meanwhile, the domestic economy remained relatively steady 
supported by monetary stability. Unfortunately, such conditions were not fully utilised to 
foster economic growth, primarily because of inefficiency as well as an unfavourable business 
climate and restricted real sector growth.”12 Firms’ internal problems are coupled with 
external structural problems in the economy following a deep crisis. 
  
3. Theoretical Overview: Credit Market Frictions  
3.1. The Financing Constraint Paradigm 
Theoretically, monetary authority is generally able to affect the corporate sector 
through multiple channels. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) differentiate the ‘balance sheet 
channel’ from the ‘bank lending channel.’ The balance sheet channel focuses on the impact of 
monetary policy on the borrower’s balance sheet through the firm’s net worth, cash flow, and 
liquid assets. Meanwhile, the bank lending channel reveals the role of monetary policy 
through changes in loan supply as effected by banking institutions. 
Hubbard (1998) makes a distinction between the ‘money view’ and ‘credit view’ to 
understand the channels though which monetary policy affects economic variables. The credit 
                                                 
10 Comparisons with neighboring countries in East Asia and Latin America is also addressed in the study by 
Juda Agung et al. (2000) 
11 This issue is still debatable. Espanol (2005), for example, provides empirical evidence that, following a 
financial crisis in Argentina, the tradable sector was more financially constrained than the non-tradable sector.  
12 Bank Indonesia, Financial Stability Review II – 2006, No.8 March 2007. 
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view considers the financial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1998) to consist of 
the magnification of initial shocks by financial market conditions. This argument is based on 
the problems of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders creating a gap 
between the cost of external and internal financing.  
 Azis (2004) argues that the ineffectiveness of monetary policy can be closely 
associated with the problem of credit allocation. Furthermore, unlike in traditional monetary 
economics, the basic premises underpinning the new monetary economic are: (1) credit, not 
interest rates, plays the central role in determining economic activities; (2) the presence of 
asymmetric information implies that there is a cost for acquiring information (agency cost) 
and that this cost is sunk; (3) the relation between money and output is not necessarily stable. 
 Recent developments in monetary and finance theory take into account the 
informational and incentive problem in financial markets influencing capital-structure and 
investment decisions. This premise is referred to as the ‘financing constraint paradigm,’ 
which explains how market imperfections and corporate balance-sheet conditions correlate 
with firm-level investment. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) are the founding fathers of 
the financing constraint paradigm. Jensen and Mecking demonstrate that incentive or agency 
problems raise the cost of external finance. Agency problems emerge when managers control 
the firm without owning it. Meanwhile, Myers and Majluf concern themselves with 
information problems, arguing that if managers are better informed than investors about a 
firm’s prospects, the firm’s risky securities will sometimes be under-priced. In this case, the 
cost of external finance should be raised. 
 The main concern of this paper is to examine how liquidity, or the availability of 
internal funds, determines investment when there are information problems in the capital 
market. Many studies have documented a positive relationship between liquidity and 
investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991; 
Chirinko and Schaller, 1996; Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002; Bruinshoofd, 2003; Mizen and 
Vermeulen, 2005;). In these studies, cash flow or cash stock usually stand as a proxy for 
liquidity, while investment is measured by capital expenditures deflated by capital stock. The 
sensitivity relation between investment and internal liquidity is referred to as a degree-of-
financing constraint. 
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Fazzari et al. (1988) claims that the sensitivity of investment to increases in internal 
funds is driven by financing constraints resulting from informational problems in the capital 
market. This argument is known as the financing constraint paradigm. Fazzari et al. also show 
that investment–cash-flow sensitivities are greater for firms with low dividend payout ratios. 
This greater sensitivity means higher financial constraints. Bruinshoofd (2003) supports the 
joint hypothesis that constrained firms can be identified and display a stronger sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow.  
However, the use of investment–cash-flow sensitivity has received some important 
criticism. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the financing constraint paradigm by arguing 
that investment–cash-flow sensitivity is not a useful indicator of financing constraints, as it is 
not necessarily related monotonically to the cost of external finance or to the level of internal 
funds available. Therefore, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) propose discarding the use of 
investment–cash-flow sensitivities in the empirical analysis of financing constraints. 
Some studies, on the other hand, have employed this approach based on investment–
cash-flow sensitivity. Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) documented that firms with higher 
levels of cash-flow volatility have lower capital expenditure, research and development costs, 
and advertising expenses. According to this study, one explanation for this relation is that 
different levels of investment produce different volatilities, depending on the nature of the 
investment. Firms commonly do not use external debt and equity markets to smooth cash flow 
volatility, because the costs of accessing capital markets also are related to the volatility of a 
firm’s cash flow. 
Overall, there are several valid reasons to support the argument that internal liquidity 
is significantly related to investment. Chirinko and Schaller (1996) describe two reasons why 
liquidity matters in investment equations. One is that firms face financial constraints that 
drive a wedge between the costs of internal and external finance. The second explanation is 
that liquidity serves as a proxy for omitted variables and other specification problems.  
 
3.2. Boom-Bust Cycles 
Under the financing constraint paradigm, one of the most important sources of 
financial fragility is linked to credit market imperfections. Credit market imperfections in 
developing countries entail three important problems, namely, the existence of borrowing 
constraints, currency mismatch, and systemic bailout guarantees (Tornell and Westermann, 
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2003). This is the reason why countries that have liberalized their financial system tend to 
experience a greater risk of crises. Financial liberalization is usually followed by risky 
international bank flows and lending booms. Tornell and Westermann explain that such 
imperfections in credit markets mean that financial liberalization in middle-income countries 
has typically been followed by lending booms, ending with twin currency and banking crises 
that, in turn, result in a protracted credit crunch.  
It is a trade-off between high growth and an elevated risk of crises, since factors that 
contribute to financial fragility are also a source of growth. In this case, credit markets play a 
key role in such large fluctuations, not only in the boom-bust episodes that surround crises, 
but also in the strong ‘credit channel’ observed in tranquil times, that is, the strong response 
of GDP and other macroeconomic variables to credit market shocks (Tornell and 
Westermann, 2004).  
Credit channels play an important role in economic fluctuation by influencing sectoral 
economics, especially in dissociating the tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sectors of the 
economy. In tranquil times, asymmetry in financing opportunities can cause asymmetric 
sectoral development between the T- and N-sectors, in which the N-sector grows faster than 
T-sector. For several years following a crisis, the N-sector’s output would then decline 
relative to that of the T-sector. 
In a liberal financial system, the asymmetry in financing opportunities across the T- 
and N-sectors may be accompanied a currency mismatch in credit, in which a substantial 
amount of N-sector debt is dollar denominated, while its income remains in domestic 
currency. In developing countries, the government plays an important role in protecting 
corporate borrowing through systematic guarantees. Then this policies are usually followed 
by an imprudent and un-hedging behavior on corporate borrowing in both the banking and 
corporate sectors. 
Accordingly, these three factors, namely, asymmetry in financing opportunities, 
government guarantees, and currency mismatches, can, acting in combination, be extremely 
dangerous and result in a financial crisis. This fundamental fragility could then easily be 
exacerbated by panic behavior or self-fulfilling actions by investors, since the government’s 
systematic guarantees are commonly accompanied by enforceability problems which can, in 
turn, generate self-reinforcing mechanisms. Tornell and Westermann (2002a) describe the 
mechanism as follows. If many N-sector agents gamble by denominating their debt in foreign 
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currency, exchange rate risk may be created endogenously, as the economy becomes 
vulnerable to self-fulfilling mechanisms in the banking system. Usually, N-sector firms face 
severe contract enforceability problems and their lenders enjoy systematic bailout 
guarantees—in the event of crises, lenders are bailed out at the taxpayers’ expense (Tornell 
and Westermann 2004). 
Furthermore, Tornell and Westermann also explain that contract enforceability 
problems, together with bailout guarantees, may easily generate stringent financing 
constraints and lead borrowers to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. In 
such a case, the shocks to firms’ cash flow have a strong effect on the economy. This 
mechanism is referred to as a ‘balance sheet effect mechanism’. 
Credit market imperfections have caused boom-bust cycles in credit, in which 
financing opportunities across the T- and N-sectors become asymmetric, the process being 
followed by economic vulnerability. It is therefore evident that asymmetric financing 
opportunities are vital in understanding financial fragility and economic vulnerability in 
developing countries, where credit market friction is common. 
  
4. Empirical Research 
To deal with the question of which sector, T or N, performs better in the pre- and post-
crisis periods, this paper employs a relatively rigorous equation to measure the sensitivity of 
firm-level investment and its liquidity. Put simply, this study intends to examine the boom-
bust cycle by employing the financing constraint paradigm. 
 
4.1. Investment equation 
Since the 1988 seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (FHP), the issue of 
financing constraints and firms’ investment have been debated in the literature.13 FHP show 
that firms identified as, a priori, financially constrained should exhibit greater sensitivity in 
investment and the availability of internal finance in terms of cash flow. In their hypothesis on 
the financing constraint paradigm, they claim that the sensitivity of investment and liquidity is 
driven by the presence of asymmetric information in the capital market. 
                                                 
13 Differing from MM, FHP assume that external finance is more expensive since asymmetric information is 
present.  
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This argument differs substantially from the neoclassical perspective on investment, as 
expressed by Modigliani and Miller (MM; 1958), who advocate the irrelevance of financial 
structure theory, by explaining that financial policy is separate from real investment decisions 
under certain conditions.14 Conversely, FHP propose theoretical models of the imperfections 
in the capital market, which imply that external financing is more costly than internal 
financing for many firms. Since the degree of asymmetric information and agency costs 
depends on a firm’s characteristics, certain firms may be more sensitive to financial factors 
than others. In other words, industrial or individual characteristics of firms become important 
determinants of their investment sensitivity to internal finance (cash flow). 
Under FHP’s argument, investment should be significantly related by proxy to 
changes in a firm’s net worth or internal funds. As do many previous studies, this paper uses 
the ratio of cash flow to capital stock (CF/K) as the internal financing condition of firms. A 
large body of research has found that the sensitivity between investment and cash flow are 
higher for financially constrained firms (FHP, 1998; Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002). 
To provide empirical evidence, this paper uses the basic equation originally developed 
by FHP (1988) as follows:  
 
I = f(investment opportunities) + g(internal funds). 
 
Or, 
 
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
K
CFg
K
Xf
K
I ε+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−−− 111
   (1) 
 
Where Iit represents investment in fixed assets for firm i during period t, X represents a vector 
of variables, and ε is the error in i and t.  
Following FHP (1988), the function g depends on the firm’s internal cash flow (CF), 
which represents the potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in available internal 
                                                 
14 In their seminal paper, “Theory of Capital Structure”, published in 1958, MM argue that firms’ financial 
structure will not affect their market value in a frictionless capital market. They assume that information is 
perfect in the capital market. 
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finance, after investment opportunities are accounted for through the variables in X. All 
variables are divided by the capital stock at the beginning of the period (Kt-1). 
The sensitivity of internal capital and investment is commonly analyzed by dividing 
samples depending on firms’ characteristics; for example, firms are categorized according to 
their (low or high) dividend payout rate (Fazzari et al., 1998), status as Keiretsu or 
independent firms (Hoshi et al., 1991), bond rating (Whited, 1992), and whether they belong 
to the tradable or non-tradable sector (Espanol, 2005). As the interest of this research resides 
in the asymmetry of sectoral development, this paper runs regression for two categories of 
firm, classifying them as tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sector firms. Fixed assets are used 
as a proxy for long-term investment. For capturing the sensitivity of the T- and N-sectors, this 
paper employs the following equation: 
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Where  
K  = fixed assets 
I   =  long-term, or gross, investment (Kt – Kt-1) 
CF  = cash flow 
Q  = Tobin’s Q 
TS  = total sales 
WC  = working capital (current assets – current liabilities) 
TD  = total debt  
T  = tradable sector 
N  = non-tradable sector 
 
We are also concerned with the industrial-sector effects. To achieve this, this paper 
uses an equation in which dummies for different industrial sectors are introduced. This allows 
us to focus on the effect of its industrial sector on the relation between a firm’s investment 
and liquidity. For this purpose, this paper does not split the sample into two different groups 
as was done for equations (2). We employ equation as follows with dummies for each sector.  
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(3)  
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Industrial sector dummies15
1. Sector A (basic industry): agriculture (sector 1), mining (sector 2). 
2. Sector B (manufacturing): basic industry and chemical industries (sector 3), 
miscellaneous industry (sector 4), consumer goods industry (sector 5). 
3. Sector C (services): property, real estate, and building construction (sector 6), 
infrastructure, utilities, and transportation (sector 7), trade, service, and investment 
(sector 9).16 
 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1. Investment  
Firm-level investment is commonly understood as the value of machinery, plant, and 
buildings that are bought by firms for production purposes. Accordingly, this paper uses fixed 
assets as proxy for investment over long-term periods. Theoretical predictions consider that 
constrained firms should display a stronger sensitivity of investment to cash flow (FHP, 1998; 
Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002; Bruinshoofd, 2003). In this case, if the N-sector faces greater 
financial constraints than the T-sector, αcfN would be expected to be higher than αcfT. 
  
4.2.2. Cash-Flow 
In Fazzari, Ferri and Greenberg (2003), we find that in the Keynesian endogenous 
investment model, if cash flow is insufficient to finance investment, firms take on debt. The 
implication is that investment activities should be financed primarily by internal finance 
before accessing external sources. In this case, cash flow would generally be negatively 
related to firm investment. 
Recently, a large body of literature has suggested that, due to information asymmetries 
and capital market imperfections, corporate investment expenditure is significantly influenced 
                                                 
15 For sector dummies we use the JASICA or sectoral index classification which was released by the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange Authority in January 1996. 
16 We exclude the financial sector (sector 8) since the financial statements of this sector are substantially 
different from those of industries in other sectors. 
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by firms’ ability to generate internal cash. This leads to the explanation that firms prefer 
internal equity to external debt, with the result that investment should be related negatively to 
debt. 
 
4.2.3. Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is associated with a firm’s market capitalization, reflecting the market 
anticipations of investment opportunities in firm profitability. Tobin’s Q is measured by the 
market value of assets deflated by their book value. In this paper, αq is expected to be 
significant and positive.  
 
4.2.4. Profitability 
In this paper, sales in period previous to that probed are used as a proxy for 
profitability. By common sense, profitability increases with investment. We expect that 
profitability will be significant and positive. Profitability is considered to explain the past and 
potential future performance of a firm. It is consistent with the sales accelerator model; higher 
sales levels will enhance production capacity in order that enlarged demand may be met 
(FHP, 1988). 
 
4.2.5. Working Capital  
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) describe working capital as composed of current assets 
(chiefly, accounts receivable, inventories, and cash) less current liabilities (primarily, 
accounts payable and short-term debt), and as measuring the firm’s net position in liquid 
assets. Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that, due to financial constraints, it is costly for 
firms to change their level of fixed investment, and thus they seek to maintain a stable fixed-
investment path, over commensurate options requiring working capital adjustments. This 
argument is comparable to the internal net works hypothesis (Bernanke and Gertler, 1986).  
External finance, if available, may be more costly than internal finance because of 
transaction costs, agency problems, and asymmetric information. Thus, ceteris paribus, when 
firms choose to decrease (increase) their working capital investment, fixed investment levels 
should rise (fall) correspondingly.  
In this case, αwk is expected to be significant and negative.  
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4.2.6. Debt 
There are two opposite theoretical approaches treating the relationship between a 
firm’s leverage and its cash flow. Trade-off theory suggests a positive relationship 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), while pecking order behavior implies a negative relationship 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Meanwhile, signaling theory suggests that a higher debt ratio can 
be considered as a signal of an improved capacity to finance investment, hence yielding a 
positive relationship between debt and investment. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Data set and Univariate Analysis 
This study is composed of all non-financial firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSX), and based on yearly accounting data provided by JSX’s database and the Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory (ICMD) maintained by ECFIN, a private company. We have 298 
samples, comprising all non-financial firms listed at different time periods. Neither database 
contains cash flow variables. Accordingly, we directly accessed each firm’s annual report, as 
documented on the JSX. In this case, we manually input data. 
We retain only data covering at least five consecutive years. Furthermore, we exclude 
outliers by sorting data based upon its standard deviation, removing data with more than 
10.00 standard deviations. This leaves 147 firms over the period 1994–2004. For 
classification of the T- and N-sectors, this research follows that used by the JSX.  
To examine the different investment levels between the T- and N-sectors, this paper 
employs two tests of variance, which are the t-test for mean variance (t-statistic) and the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for median variance (z-statistic). It is clear from 
Table (1) that there is no significant difference in firm-level investment between the two 
sectors. But there is significant difference on inventory, in which T sector has much more 
inventory than N sector. Others important differences are that T sector has much more total 
sales and working capital, with high significant differences in both mean and median 
variances, whereas tradable sector’s total debts are much less than those of N sector.  
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Table 1. Summary of  statistics  
 
t-test for mean variance and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for median variance.  
 
      Mean Stan DevMedian Max Min t-test p-value z-test p-value
Investment over capital stock 
All          0,08747 -0,05847 0,66528 9,39441 -0,93234 -0.0899 0.9284 0.183 0.8552
T sector      0,08842 -0,06281 0,67803 9,39441 -0,91596     
N sector          0,08477 -0,04775 0,62866 5,38558 -0,93234
Inventory over capital stock 
All          -0,00416 -0,00006 0,26979 2,78275 -3,85270 -2.8215 0.0048 -2.451 0.0142
T sector 0,00791 0,00121 0,19359 1,20020 -1,36137     
N sector          -0,03833 -0,00040 0,41425 2,78275 -3,85270
Cash flow over capital stock 
All          0,03608 0,00250 0,35521 7,84430 -1,95120 -1.0116 0.3119 -0.996 0.3193
T sector 0,04196 0,00340 0,37717 7,84430 -1,95120     
N sector 0,01988 0,00044 0,28602 2,11622 -1,36923     
Tobin's Q 
All          1,13500 1,00620 0,55820 6,58397 -0,95640 -1.6526 0.0986 -0.273 0.7846
T sector      1,14983 1,01269 0,58757 6,58397 0,32254     
N sector 1,09319 0,99041 0,46376 4,48206 -0,95640     
Total sales over capital stock 
All          1,92275 1,20791 1,83441 9,97830 0,01435 -5.0959 0.0000 -8.607 0.0000
T sector      2,06993 1,41080 1,81042 9,97830 0,01435     
N sector          1,50580 0,69680 1,84028 8,53232 0,03524
Working capital over capital stock 
All          0,23517 0,16262 1,25500 7,96675 -8,25325  -3.6612 0.0003 -3.798 0.0001
T sector 0,30783 0,20161 1,30662 7,96675 -8,25325     
N sector 0,02932 0,05957 1,07077 3,82783 -5,03821     
Total debt over capital stock 
All          1,68833 1,34431 1,23987 8,70960 0,10730 6.0999 0.0000 4.127 0.0000
T sector      1,56972 1,31962 1,10129 8,70960 0,11598     
N sector          2,02434 1,47720 1,51957 7,34419 0,10730
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In Graph 4, we can see how investment in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors 
fell during the crisis.17 We can also remark that at the onset of crisis (1995–1996), in both the 
T- and N-sectors, the investment rate tends to diminish. From this graph, it seems that there is 
no significant difference between the investment levels of firms belonging to the tradable and 
non-tradable sectors; they change comparably. 
 
Graph 4. Mean of Firm-level Investment over Capital Stock (
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
In Graph 5, we can see that the mean of inventory for N sector is more severely 
affected by exchange rate depreciation than that of T sector. However, since 2003 their trends 
are comparable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This study uses time lag variables as the deflator, which is gross capital. Consequently, the time covered 
by the study is lessened by one period due to the absence of a deflator for last period (1994). 
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Graph 5. Mean of Inventory change over Capital Stock ⎟⎟⎠
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
In terms of cash flow volatility, or firm liquidity, as is described in Graph 6, it seems 
that sector N fluctuates more severely than sector T. But the recent year (it mean 2004), the 
cash flow of N sector is higher than that of T sector.  
 
Graph 6. Mean of Cash Flow over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
It seems that Tobin’s Q, as a proxy for firms’ value, does not differ significantly 
between the sectors. By graphical observation, Graph 7 shows a slight difference in Tobin’s Q 
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between the two sectors; however, from the tests of variance, it is evident that there is no 
significant difference in Tobin’s Q. The test for differences in the median demonstrates the 
insignificance difference between the T- and N-sectors. But t-test shows significant difference 
in which Tobin’s Q of T sector is slightly higher than that of N sector.  
 
Graph 7. Mean of Tobin Q  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
 From the following graph (Graph 8), it seems that the T-sector has a much higher level 
of sales than the N-sector. Test of variance also shows a significant difference at the one 
percent level for the t-statistic and z-statistic. The differences are important; the mean 
difference is 5.095 and the median difference is 8.607, both with one percent level of 
significance.  
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Graph 8. Mean of Total Sales over Capital Stock ⎟⎟⎠
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
 
In terms of working capital, Graph 9 shows that the T- and N-sectors also have 
important difference where T sector is much higher than N sector following a financial crisis.  
 
Graph 9. Mean of Working Capital over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
 
In terms of debt, N-sector levels are much higher than those of the T-sector. Previous 
studies found that the N-sector in South East Asian countries plays an important role in 
propagating financial crisis, because it mostly gains revenue in local currencies, while holding 
 22
   
leverage in foreign currencies. The N-sector has a higher debt ratio than the T-sector. This 
evidence is supported by the t-statistic (6.099) and z-statistic (4.127). Both tests are 
significant at the one percent level. 
 
Graph 10. Mean of Total Debt over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and the  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN. 
Note: T is the tradable sector, N is the non-tradable sector. 
  
During the crisis (1997–1998), firms had a higher rate of debt due to currency 
depreciation than in the pre-crisis period. Data from Bank Indonesia (Graphs 1, 2, and 3) 
shows that outstanding investment credit increased during the crisis period even though 
interest rates were also boosted. It seems that most firms failed to reschedule their debts, and 
to avoid the risk of bankruptcy, they had to access external finance.  
Many firms collapsed. Firms experiencing great difficulties in paying their debt were 
taken over by the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA), whose main task is to 
restructure the banking sector by taking over firms with bad debts.  
However, both sectors differ significantly in regard to profitability and debt level. 
Over the full period (1994–2005), the N-sector had much higher levels of debt. In terms of 
profitability, the N-sector has higher profitability than the T-sector.  
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5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
5.2.1. Tradable and Non-tradable Sector Analysis 
 This research uses two methods of panel data analysis, namely fixed-effect and 
random-effect models. The random-coefficient model assumes that, conditional on company-
specific effects, remaining slope coefficients are randomly distributed about a certain mean 
for each group (Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu 1997).  
Concerning the main goal of this paper, we follow Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), who predict that the higher coefficient of correlation between cash flow and 
investment represents firms having greater financial constraints. Table 2 demonstrates the 
regression results for investment. We find that over the full period (1994–2004), the non-
tradable (N) sector and the tradable (T) sector have no significant coefficient of correlation 
between cash flow and investment. It seems that for both sectors, the internal finance is not 
important variable affecting the investment level.  
When we compare the sensitivity relation between cash flow and investment in the 
pre- and post-crisis periods, we find that in the pre-crisis period, both sectors have negative 
significant relation between investment and cash flow, whereas in the post-crisis period, both 
sectors have no significant correlation between internal finance and investment.  
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Table 2. Regression for Investment 
 
We use Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) estimations. For specification, we employ Hausman test. *, **, ***, denote 
significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported below the correlation value. 
 
 Total Period Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE
CF over CS for T sector           -0,1069 -0,0969 ** -0,7285 *** -0,3649 ** -0,0182 -0,0191
 0,0717         0,0502  0,2392  0,1616  0,0482 0,0459
CF over CS for N sector            0,0676 -0,1107 -1,5637 ** -0,1525 -0,0391 -0,2787 **
 0,2323          0,1176 0,7182  0,2602 0,1672 0,1263  
Tobin’s Q            -0,0212 -0,0160 0,0644 0,1383 -0,1023 *** -0,0892 ***
 0,0430          0,0325 0,2922 0,1072 0,0332  0,0274  
Total Sales over CS            0,1216 *** 0,0431 *** 0,0406 0,0794 * 0,0851 *** 0,0556 ***
 0,0216  0,0129       0,0948 0,0450  0,0192  0,0114  
Working Capital over CS            0,0814 *** 0,0799 *** 0,1353 -0,1316 * 0,0518 ** 0,0237
 0,0239  0,0170        0,1680 0,0699  0,0219  0,0150
Total Debt over CS            0,2735 *** 0,1661 *** 0,8221 *** 0,4143 *** 0,1536 *** 0,0814 ***
 0,0264  0,0163      0,1511  0,0583  0,0249  0,0149  
             
Observation             1328 1328 212 212 856 856
R-squared 0.3139           0.3037 0.6513 0.1687 0.2999 0.0320 
             
Hausman test          91.97   25.65   47.46
p-value         0.0000    0.0003   0.0000
Specification         FE   FE   FE
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Table 3. Regression for Inventory 
 
We use Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) estimations. For specification, we employ Hausman test. *, **, ***, denote 
significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported below correlation value.  
 
 Total Period Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
    FE RE FE RE FE RE
CF over CS for T sector -0,2105 *** -0,1104 *** -0,0806  -0,0520  -0,3697 *** -0,2930 *** 
 0,0334       0,0228  0,0928 0,0396 0,0389  0,0348  
CF over CS for N sector -0,0611  0,0146  -0,2729 ** -0,0040  -0,1717  -0,0448  
 0,1082         0,0532 0,2786  0,0591 0,1347 0,0846
Tobin’s Q           0,0538 *** 0,0471 *** 0,2514 0,0837 *** -0,0247 0,0152
 0,0200        0,0148  0,1134 0,0219  0,0268 0,0190
Total Sales over CS            0,0267 *** 0,0112 * 0,0434 0,0326 *** -0,0180 0,0004
 0,0101        0,0059  0,0368 0,0098  0,0155 0,0072
Working Capital over CS            0,0292 *** 0,0290 *** -0,0073 -0,0014 0,0665 **** 0,0227 **
 0,0111       0,0077  0,0652 0,0156 0,0176  0,0097  
Total Debt over CS            0,0323 *** 0,0018 0,0720 0,0092 0,0739 *** -0,0056
 0,0123         0,0074 0,0586 0,0127 0,0200  0,0094
             
Observation            1328 1328 212 212 856 856
R-squared 0.1363          0.0082 0.3388 0.1251 0.2483 0.0062 
             
Hausman test          46.43  -  42.39 
p-value         0.0000  -  0.0000 
Specification         FE  FE  FE 
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In general, based upon observation of firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, we 
can find that over the full period under study, there is no significant correlation between 
internal finance and firm-level investment. This finding is interesting since it provide a 
different insight from several predictions, especially that of Tornell and Westermann (2002a, 
2004). The behavior of both sectors in Indonesia is relatively comparable. This finding might 
be supported by the credit supply data, in which we can see that credit supply to the N-sector 
is higher than credit to the T-sector. In Graphs 2 and 3, outstanding investment credit from 
commercial banks to the N-sector in total and foreign currency exceeded credit to the T-
sector for several years after the crisis hit. Data on the median of total debt over capital stock, 
as shown in Graph 10, also demonstrates that the N-sector consumed more debt than the T-
sector in the post-crisis period. Recent analysis of the current condition of Indonesia’s 
economy also shows that the tradable sector in Indonesia is still in collapse after ten years of 
crisis.  
Despite cash-flow–investment sensitivity, this study also shows that Tobin’s Q is not 
useful in predicting investment over both the full period and the pre-crisis period, while in 
the post-crisis period it is negatively correlated with investment. The higher value of firms is 
predicted as firms with lower levels of investment.  
Total sales as a proxy for future profitability are related positively to investment over 
the full period and post crisis period. Another variable examined in the estimation is the 
working capital. Table 2 also shows that the working capital is related positively to 
investment.  
This research also finds that debt is related positively to investment, with the 
correlation much higher in the pre-crisis period than in the post-crisis period. In other words, 
firms were much more exposed to external finance during the pre-crisis period than during 
the post-crisis period. This piece of evidence is consistent with trade-off theory (Modigliani 
and Miller 1958), which predicts that financing choices are irrelevant to investment 
decisions, as the capital market works perfectly, allowing firms to access external capital 
easily and without cost. In the pre-crisis period, listed firms in Indonesia preferred to use 
external rather than internal debt, thus neglecting informational and agency costs. In other 
words, firms in Indonesia tended to be opportunistic in the pre-crisis period. 
As well as investment, this research is also concerned with the behavior of inventory. 
Table 3 shows the results of regression for inventory as a dependent variable; we find that 
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cash flow for the N-sector is always related negatively to inventory. This leads to the 
explanation that firms in the N-sector are predicted to be able to finance short-term 
investment in their operational activities or inventory using internal finance. Meanwhile, 
firms in the T-sector have to access external finance to support their operational activities 
(inventory), especially in the post-crisis period.  
Tobin’s Q as a firm value variable is positively related to inventory in pre-crisis 
period, but is not significantly relevant in post-crisis period. The working capital as well as 
debt, is related negatively to inventory. 
 
5.2.2. Industrial Sectors Analysis 
 The main idea of this section is to capture the effect of industrial sector on the relation 
between investment and internal liquidity. This paper considers industrial sectors by the 
definition of JXS, which is divided into 9 sub-sectors18. Table (4) shows the results of 
regression for each sector estimates by employing the equation (3). One of the important 
finding from this section is that in most cases or sectors, debt is always positively and 
significantly related to investment. It means that for most sectors, debt is supposed to be 
important variable for sustaining their investment.  
 By graphical observation, it seems that sector 6 (property, real estate & building 
construction sector) has a high investment volatility. Generally, due to the 1997 currency 
depreciation, firm investment level in sector 6 diminishes significantly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See JASICA classification as mentioned above 
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Graph 11. Median of Investment over Capital Stock  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
Graph 12. Median of the Change of Inventory over Capital Stock  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
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Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
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Table 4. Regression for sectoral effects 
 
In this case, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with correction for heteroscedasticity (robust). *, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported below correlation value. 
 
Sector 1 = agriculture; Sector 2 = mining; Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical; Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry; Sector 5 = consumer good industry; Sector 6 = 
property, real estate & building construction;  Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation; Sector 9 = trade, service & investment.  
 
CS is capital stock  
 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 Sector 9 
Cash Flow over CS        -0,3758 -0,4388 ** -0,0082 -0,5357 * -0,1017  -0,1270 -0,5434 -0,1003 
 0,3108            0,1920  0,0568 0,3240  0,1366  0,7872 0,3467 0,1361
Tobin Q over CS                 0,0916 -0,0062 -0,0675 -0,1507 *** 0,0520 -0,0638 -0,0636 0,0810
 0,1078             0,1401 0,0789 0,0577  0,0737  0,2482 0,0732 0,0547
Total Sales over CS                 -0,0449 -0,1075 -0,0519 ** 0,0188 0,0769 * 0,0490 0,1176 -0,0102
 0,0676             0,0763 0,0196  0,0282 0,0405  0,1325 0,1419 0,0167
Working Capital over 
CS 
0,3847              *** 0,3949 *** 0,0589 ** -0,0060 0,0382  0,0465 -0,0100 0,1276 ***
 0,1257              0,1128 0,0252 0,0740 0,0548  0,0738 0,1875 0,0403
Total Debt CS                 0,3319 *** 0,3604 *** 0,0819 *** 0,0997 ** 0,0809 0,1166 ** 0,8191 *** 0,1668 ***
 0,1107        0,1287  0,0322  0,0449  0,0520  0,0564  0,1727  0,0522  
Constant -0,4662                *** -0,3268 * 0,0768 0,0472 -0,2986 *** -0,2020 -0,6531 *** -0,3435 ***
 0,1738           0,1933  0,0845 0,0858 0,1070  0,3230 0,2095  0,0886  
                 
Observation                 38 47 374 293 221 94 67 194
R-Squared                0.4044 0.3165 0.0476 0.0447  0.1590 0.0833 0.5158  0.1861 
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Meanwhile, by observing graph 13 below, it seems that due to currency depreciation 
firms in sector 2 (mining) decrease significantly their cash flow. Firms in sector 4 
(miscellaneous industry), which include industries such as machinery and heavy equipment, 
automotive and components, cable and electronics, have high level of cash flow.   
 
Graph 13. Median of Cash Flow over Capital Stock  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
 
 In graph (14) below, we can see that firms in sector 5 (consumer good) have relatively 
high market expectation. It seems that firms in sector 5 have high performance in the capital 
market.  
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Graph 14. Median of Tobin Q  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
 By data descriptive in graph (15) below, we find that sector 9 (trade, service and 
investment) gain most profitable revenue among other sector. Currency crisis does not reduce 
the sales of the firms in this sector.  
 
Graph 15. Median of Total Sales over Capital Stock  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
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Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
In term of working capital, in the aftermath of crisis, firms in sector agriculture have 
smallest ratio of working capital to capital stock among other sectors.  
 
Graph 16. Median of Working Capital over Capital Stock 
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
 In the following graph (17), it is important to note that property sector has a high ratio 
of debt which could be risky. Property sector is basically an unproductive sector. This 
descriptive data support the regression result due to the role of property sector (non-tradable 
sector) in risk to exacerbate crisis in Indonesia.  
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Graph 17. Median of Total Debt over Capital Stock 
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian  
Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
  
Data from Bank Indonesia as shown in graph 3 above describes how non-tradable 
sector actually have been more exposed to foreign debts than T sector. Data on outstanding 
credit of commercial banks to investment in foreign currency shows there is an inverse 
fluctuation between supply of credit to T and N sector. Before crisis T-sector has had more 
foreign debt than N-sector, but in post crisis period N-sector exceeded T-sector.  
By observing data of the 200 greatest debtor collected by IBRA (Indonesian Banking 
Restructuring Agency), we can see that the proportion of T and N sector is comparable. As 
shown in appendix, there are 100 firms from N-sector and 95 firms from T-sector from the 
200 greatest obligors under IBRA. Among 100 non-tradable firms, 54 firms are firm in 
service industry, and 28 from trade/hotel/restaurant industry, 7 from 
transportation/warehouse/telecommunication industry, and 11 from construction. In tradable 
sector, 83 firms are firms in manufacture, 11 firms are agribusiness and 1 firm from mining 
sector19.  
 
 
                                                 
19 For detail data, see appendix 
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6. Conclusion 
 The main finding of this paper is that in the pre- and post crisis period, both the T- and 
N-sectors experience no significant financial constraints. These findings are relatively 
different from previous studies, especially that by Tornell and Westermann (2002a, 2004). 
However, it seems that firms in the non-tradable sector are more easily released from severe 
problems than the tradable sector, since firms in the tradable sector have complicated 
obstacles to undertaking their business. The tradable sector, or real sector, therefore endured 
very difficult conditions for several years after the crisis hit. 
There are two normative implications of our study. First, from an academic point of 
view, this study contributes an answer to the question of whether the sensitivity of investment 
to financial factors differs with the heterogeneity of firms’ characteristics. Second, from a 
policy point of view, the existence of a financial channel can shed light on the sources of 
volatility in corporate investment behavior. This can guide policymakers in their attempts to 
resolve the problem faced by firms of accessing sufficient funding to support their business 
activities, especially where there is a question of inducing firm-level investment. In practical 
terms, this finding could help explain why firm-level investment in post-crisis Indonesia is 
still in collapse, as well as allowing us to identify those heterogeneity factors inducing the 
severe condition of Indonesia’s economy recently. 
By employing the innovation of FHP (1988) on the sensitivity relation between firm-
level investment and its internal liquidity, this paper supports the argument that there exist 
asymmetric financing opportunities between the T- and N-sectors which could threaten 
economic stability.  
By qualitative analysis, this research finds that in terms of firm profitability and debt, 
there are very different responses among firms in the T- and N-sectors to the 1997 financial 
crisis. In general, the T-sector has higher profitability with lower levels of debt than the N-
sector. Both variables are important indicators for examining economic vulnerability from a 
micro-level perspective.  
This research therefore provides two pieces of evidence that could be significant for 
further research on the field of firms’ behavior in Indonesia. First, both the T- and N-sectors 
experience no significant financing constraints in the pre- and post-crisis period. However, 
business activities have not yet been released from deep crisis. This paper shows that the T-
sector has many more financial constraints than the N-sector in the post-crisis period. Second, 
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firms in Indonesia still generally prefer external debt to equity when financing their 
investment activities, even in this post-crisis period. This evidence leads to the conclusion that 
Indonesia’s economy is still vulnerable and prone to financial depression.  
 However, one important limitation on this investigation is data availability. Some 
variables are constructed manually, and could thus contain important discrepancies in two 
areas. First, poor availability of data leads to limited analysis, and second, efforts to provide 
data manually could involve serious errors, which are commonly present in manual work. 
Another important problem concerning the data is its high volatility, especially in investment, 
sales, and debt. To deal with this problem, we excluded many companies containing volatile 
data in certain variables. As a consequence, however, the number of firms examined in this 
study was diminished. 
Further investigation of this topic requires an improvement in econometrical methods, 
so as to yield more rigorous results. Moreover, analyzing the asymmetric financing 
opportunities between different groups of firms could be fruitful for gaining a better 
understanding of firms’ behavior as related to the financial fragility and economic 
vulnerability in Indonesia. In future research, it would be interesting to develop the theme of 
asymmetric financing opportunities to include different groups, such as family and non-family 
firms or firms with bank and non-bank relations**.  
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Apendix 
 
Profile of 200 greatest debtors under IBRA (Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency) 
    
 Non-tradable Sector  Tradable Sector 
 Service  Manufacturing
1 ABS Industry Indonesia PT 1 Adikara Nirmala PT 
2 Alfa Goldland Realty PT 2 Andatu Lestari Plywood PT 
3 Authotrans Perkasa Indonesia PT 3 Apac Inti Corpora PT 
4 Bahana Bina Ventura PT 4 Artika Optima Inti PT 
5 Bahana Investa Argha PT 5 Asriland PT 
6 Bahana Pembina Usaha Ina. 6 Bakrie&Brothers PT 
7 Bakrie International Finance 7 Bante Java Persada, PT 
8 Bakrie Investindo PT 8 Batasan PT 
9 Bekasi Fajar Industrial Estate, PT 9 Bentoel Prim, PT 
10 Bentala Lestari, PT 10 Bhirawa Steel, PT 
11 Bentala Mahaya, PT 11 Bimantara Citra, PT 
12 BNI Securities, PT 12 Buanagraha Artha Prima, PT 
13 Boga Nandini Andrawina, PT 13 Budiono Widodo 
14 Bonauli Realestate, PT 14 Bukti Jonggol Asri, PT 
15 Bunas Finance Indonesia TBK, PT 15 Bukit Welirang Indah, PT 
16 Citra Marga Finance BV 16 Bumi Angkasa Textile Indonesia, PT 
17 Danamon Finance, PT 17 Chandra Asri, PT 
18 Danareksa, PT 18 Cisadane Raya Chemicals, PT 
19 Datakom Asia, PT 19 Daya Besar Agung, PT 
20 Deemte Sakti International 20 Detta Marina, PT 
21 Dhamala Intiutama Int'l BV. PT 21 Dok & Perkapalan Kodja Bahari, PT 
22 Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, PT 22 Ekadharma Garmentama, PT 
23 Duta Anggada Realty, PT 23 Fajar Surya Perkasa, PT 
24 Eastglobe LTD 24 Frans Putratex PT 
25 Estika Yasakelola, PT 25 Gema Lapik PT 
26 Global Toserco LTD 26 Gemala Industrie, LTD 
27 Graha Sarana Pratama PT (Suryapaloh) 27 Griri Asih Indah, PT 
28 Indomas Pacific Permai, PT 28 Giri Asih Jaya PT 
29 Indopac Finance 29 Gunawan Textindo PT 
30 Inti Karsa Daksa, PT 30 Hargas Industries IND PT 
31 Jababeka Interantional BV 31 Hartono Istana Electronics PT 
32 Kondowana Safari PT 32 Industri Galvanealmas, PT 
33 Mandara Permai PT 33 Intear Pretindo Inti Citra, PT 
34 Metropolitant Land PT 34 Interworld Steel Mills Indonesia, PT 
35 Modernland Realty TBK PT 35 Inti Texturindo Raya, PT 
36 Multi Angsana Ganda PT 36 IPTN 
37 Nelson Investment INT, LTD 37 Jakarta Cakra Tunggal Steel Mills PT 
38 Ometraco Multi Artha PT 38 Jakarta Kyoei Steel 
39 Pasific Interantional Finance PT 39 Jindo Kordeco Heavy IND, PT 
40 Primaswadana Perkasa Finance PT 40 Kalhold Utama, PT 
41 Putra Surya Multidana TBK, PT 41 Kalimanis Plywood IND, PT 
42 Putra Surya Perkasa TBK, PT 42 Karawang Utama, PT 
43 Risjad Brasali Styrindo PT 43 Kertas Basuki Rachmat PT 
44 Risjadson PT 44 Kertas Leces PT 
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45 Salindo Perdana F. PT 45 Kiani Kertas PT 
46 Sanggraha Dhika PT 46 Komunikasi Selular Indonesia PT 
47 Segitiga Atrium, PT 47 Langgeng Makmur I TBK, PT 
48 Segitiga Plaza Hotel, PT 48 Lucky Star Navigation Corp. 
49 Sewu Agro Investama PT 49 Mahliagai Senantiasa Makmur 
50 Sinar Slipi Sejahtera PT 50 Maligi Spinning Mills 
51 Sumbermitra Sarana Realtindo PT 51 Mitra Laras Serasi PT 
52 Surya Citra Televisi Indonesia PT 52 Multi Strada Arah Sarana, PT 
53 Tirtamas Majutama PT 53 Multikarsa Investama, PT 
54 Welwin Finance, Hongkong 54 Nasio Dutamitra Electric PT 
  55 Nusantara Playwood PT 
 Trade/Hotel/Restaurant 56 Omedata Electronics, PT 
1 Aneka Agroprasidha PT 57 Palwa Minatama Jaladri PT 
2 Aneka Bumi Prasidha PT 58 Pancashindu Abadi PT 
3 Bakrie Nirwana Resort PT 59 Pangaji Mario Refconindo PT 
4 Banigati Betegak, PT 60 Panggung Electric Corp PT 
5 Bina Perkasa Indograha, PT 61 Papyrus Sakti PT 
6 Caterison Sukses, PT 62 Poyfin Canggih PT 
7 Citra Rapi Hotel, PT 63 Polyprima Karyareksa PT 
8 Citrasarana Graharealty Corp. 64 Prajogo Pangestu 
9 Dewata Agung Wibawa 65 Samless Pipe Indonesia Jaya PT 
10 Dharma Niaga (Persero), PT 66 Sebasli Pratama 
11 Dharmala Sakti Pancagraha 67 Semen Baturaja, PT 
12 Griya Permata Lestari 68 Semen Cibinong, PT 
13 Humpuss PT 69 Semen Gombong PT 
14 Humpuss Terminal P, PT 70 Serindo Djaja Marmer Industries, PT 
15 Mandiri Citrasejati Hotel PT 71 Sipatex Putri Lestari PT 
16 Mas Murni IND, PT 72 Sragen Abadi Tekstil PT 
17 Moeladi PT 73 Staco Arta Karya PT 
18 Mulia Intan Lestari, PT 74 Telekomindo Primabhakti PT 
19 Pengembangan Pariwisata Lombok PT 75 Tensindo Sejati PT 
20 Permadani Khatulistiwa Nusantara PT 76 Terang Kita PT 
21 Prabu Budi Mulia PT 77 The First National Glassware PT 
22 Ramasari Surya Persada PT 78 Timor Putra Nasional PT 
23 Sentra Sintetika Jaya 79 Usaha Gedung Bimantara PT 
24 Sinn Bualuang Public Company LTD 80 Wahana Perkasa Auto Jaya PT 
25 Staco Graha PT 81 Yason Pernana PT 
26 Swastika Hijau Makmur  82 Continental Sinar Steel PT 
27 Tahta Medan PT 83 Sandatex PT 
28 Tirtamas Comexindo PT   
    
 Transportation/Warehouse/Telecomunication  Agribusiness
1 Asia Cellular Sattellite PT 1 Arindo Tri Sejahtera  
2 Badiradaya Sentranusa PT 2 Bali Raya PT 
3 Merpati Nusantara PT 3 Central Pertiwi Bahari, PT 
4 Pasifik Satelit Nusantara PT 4 Gerak Maju PT 
5 Satelindo PT 5 Hasil Cipta Laut PT 
6 Sempati Air PT 6 Ika Muda Seafood International, PT 
7 Widya Duta Informindo, PT 7 Kiani Lestari PT 
  8 Nusantara Ampera Bakti PT 
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 Construction 9 Riau Andalan Kertas PT 
1 Batanghari Persada, PT 10 Riau Prima Energi PT 
2 Bukit Sentul TBK, PT 11 Tuwung Agung PT 
3 Hutama Karya, PT   
4 Karyagraha Elektrindo PT  Mining
5 Lippo Karawaci TBK, PT 1 Humpuss, INC 
6 Marga Nurindo Bhakti PT   
7 Margabumi Matraraya PT   
8 Samurindo Swadaya Sejatera AP   
9 Swadharma Primautama PT   
10 Swaraeka Prasetia PT   
11 Istaka Karya PT   
    
 NN   
1 Ceka Jawa Industri, PT   
2 Indobuildco, PT   
3 Internusa Keramik, PT   
4 Inti Keramik Alamsri, PT   
5 Risjad Brasali Peroxid   
Source: Annual Report 2000, Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
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